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This essay offers a way to avoid a clash between reasons of love and reasons of ethics that stems from a 
difference in the conception of the moral value of people. In moralities of lovers, the loved ones are due 
to be accorded a value superior to that of other people, whereas in ethics there is an inescapable 
presumption that people have a value that is equal among them. The usual way to avoid this clash has 
been either to make room in the ethical arsenal for reasons relating to particular agents, agent-relative 
reasons, or to acknowledge that love-grounded reasons legitimately compete with ethical reasons and that 
we need a method of negotiating them. Both escapes have serious problems. The essay proposes a third 
way. The first step is to reshape the notion of ’love,’ in a direction where important characteristics of our 
common understanding are kept, notably the loved ones’ uniqueness and incomparability, while the 
characteristic that is problematic in the present context would be eliminated, namely the you-and-me 
character of love that gives rise to reasons that are wholly personal and partial. The second step is to 
show how such a reformed notion of love coheres with the assumption of equal value. And the third step 
is, through this connection, to change our understanding of love as reason-giving, from generating reason 
directly to generating reason indirectly. This involves a shift of focus from reason to meta-reason, viz. 
that which makes our system of, or competence for, normative reasons reasonable. The advantage of the 
proposed solution would not only be that clash between reasons of love and reasons of ethics is avoided, 
but also that ethical reasons are seen as underpinned by love, which moreover offers the best ultimate 




A Major Problem with Love 
 
A major problem with love as reason-giving has to do with universalizability. Love, 
generally understood, has an inescapable reference to a relation between unique 
individuals.1 This relation is such that the reasons grounded by it do not imply that 
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reasons with regard to other persons even though relevantly like the loved ones in all 
their universal properties. The uniqueness of the loving relation means that the features 
of the situation may recur without you being logically required to make the same 
judgment about it in a relevantly similar situation. Hence, the reasons that are grounded 
in loving relations do not meet the requirement of universalizability. Reasons that 
articulate ethical concerns, on the other hand, are generally assumed to have an inherent 
universality, due to the non-personal character of the considerations involved. Such 
reasons are articulated with universal predicates (except for logical ones), that is, 
predicates that do not refer to any particular entities. They typically also involve 
principles, having all human beings, all persons or the like, as their scope. Therefore, 
natural as it seems that love gives us reasons for action, such reasons appear prima 
facie non-ethical. 
 
What is most troubling with a clash between reasons of love and reasons of ethics is 
that it stems from a difference in the conception of the moral status, worth, or value 
(hereafter, only ‘value’) of people. This is problematic because it takes the clash from 
being a matter of practical conflict to be a matter of conflict in essence. In moralities of 
lovers, the loved ones are due to be accorded a value superior to that of other people, 
whereas in ethics there is an inescapable presumption that people have a value that is 
equal among them. That is the case even when our ethical principles, or the outcome of 
their application, are non-egalitarian in certain respects. 
 
The assumption of equal value in ethics is evident already by the fact that ethical 
reasons apply equally to all individuals in an open-ended class. At the beginning of the 
utilitarian and consequentialist traditions one finds Jeremy Bentham’s dictum “each to 
count for one and no one for more than one”, later the principle of “equal consideration 
of interests.” On Kantian ground, it is a foundational thought that persons have an 
absolute, incomparable dignity, making them equal “ends in themselves.” In rights-
theory, there is the idea of certain rights belonging to all human beings equally. And in 
virtue theory, especially in its modern forms, a central virtue is justice, or impartiality, 
in our treatment of people, implying not giving lovers, family, friends etc. special 
treatment in contexts in which that is not universally appropriate.2
 
 
In particularistic ethics, the assumption of universality in reasons is rejected in so far as 
this involves normative principles. A crucial aspect of it is maintained, however, 
through two closely connected assumptions. The first is that moral predicates deal with 
something objective, viz. moral properties in a realist sense. The second is that moral 
reasons pertain to objective moral facts and that objective truth thus belongs to them.3 
That is to say, moral truth does not depend upon what any particular individual thinks 
or wants the case to be. Underlying these assumptions one may discern certain 
recognition of the equal value of people. Jonathan Dancy, for one, even considers it to 
be “per impossibile, no doubt” that some people are “more important (more morally 
considerable) than others.”4 




The way to avoid a clash has been either to make room in the ethical arsenal for reasons 
relating to particular agents, agent-relative reasons, or to acknowledge that love-
grounded reasons legitimately compete with ethical reasons and that we need a method 
of negotiating between them.5 Both means have serious problems that I cannot go into 
here. Instead, I propose a third, less problematic but promisingly fruitful way. I take it 
to have three steps. The first is to reshape the very notion of ‘love,’ in a direction where 
important characteristics of our common understanding are kept, notably the loved 
ones’ uniqueness and incomparability, while the characteristic that is problematic in the 
present context would be eliminated, namely the you-and-me character of love that 
gives rise to reasons that are wholly personal and partial. The second step is to show 
how such a reformed notion of love coheres with the rough assumption of equal value. 
And the third step is, through this connection, to change our understanding of love as 
reason-giving, from generating reason directly to generating reason indirectly.6
 
 This 
indirectness of love’s reason-giving involves a shift of focus from reason to meta-
reason, viz., that which makes our system of, or competence for, normative reasons 
reasonable. 
The advantage of the solution I propose is, I submit, not only that a part of the conflict 
between the uniqueness of love and the universality of ethics is overcome, but also that 
ethical reasons will be seen as underpinned by love, which moreover offers the best 
ultimate explanation of them. 
 
 
The Assumption of Equal Value 
 
The assumption of equal value between human beings, or persons, is a widespread and 
well-entrenched but yet obscure idea, for which reason it tends to appear mainly at 
solemn occasions. An example is the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1976), according to which “the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world,” these rights deriving “from the inherent dignity of the 
human person.” Another example is the first article of the first chapter of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000), saying “Human dignity is 
inviolable. It must be respected and protected.” 
 
Philosophers often take the assumption of equal value to be axiomatic but at the same 
time rather ideological, a background assumption, something at the dim end of 
justification. This obscurity has to do with the difficulty to defend or even understand 
the idea that all human beings have equal value. The difficulty stems from 
considerations about explaining why people would have such value, when they differ in 
all human qualities, like degree of personhood, rationality, moral decency, sociality, 
happiness, value to themselves and others, etc. We commonly take people to have value 
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according to their qualities, for instance, their economic, social, cultural, aesthetic and 
other contributions. And even though the constitution of most states hail the assumption 
of equal value, it is clear that they value citizens differently from non-citizens. 
 
The assumption of equal value, therefore, is theoretically unjustified if one intends the 
total value of individuals, or any one of the various values mentioned above. It is a 
specifically ethical value, and as such it is of an exceptional kind, in that it would 
ignore the positive and negative qualities of people. Instead, it somehow applies to 
them “in themselves.” Possession of this value is basic and compatible with us differing 
in all other evaluative respects, ethical and non-ethical. In so far as ethical concerns 
override other kinds of concern, which it paradigmatically is taken to do, this ethical 
equal value of individuals overrides all non-ethical unequal values that they may have. 
It is furthermore a value that cannot be traded off by other ethical values. 
 
What we otherwise recognize as values, viz. values of ends, final or intrinsic values – 
final values, for short – and values of means, instrumental values, is something that 
comes in degrees and denotes states that we may achieve and lose. Since we differ with 
regard to such values, let me call them ‘differential values.’ The value that would be 
equal among us cannot have degrees, and cannot be achieved or lost (so long as we 
live). I refer to this feature by calling it is an inherent value. The inherent value 
applicable to human beings, or persons, is incomparable, I submit. This is why inherent 
value is equal among us. Now, to many the idea of an inherent, equal ethical value is 
not only obscure but even repulsive; it would be an offence to assume that, for instance, 
Adolf Hitler and Martin Luther King, Jr., in any way would have equal ethical value. 
To counter this objection appears difficult, yet love shows a way. 
 
Before I take on this task, let me note that inherent human value must not be mistaken 
for another, similar, kind of value. Consider the idea that human life has a unique value 
compared to that of other life forms. Even though we cannot choose a non-human life, 
we consider human life more valuable than other forms of life, because we would 
prefer it to all other if we had the choice. This consideration is similar to the thought 
that it is better to be born than not to be born, and better to be a self-conscious creature 
than to be a non-self-conscious one. Valuations like these are preference-based and 
depend on the assumed differential values realized in various forms of life; to exist and 
to be self-conscious are preconditions for the realization of our cherished differential 
values. Even though these preconditions in a sense are inherent in us they differ from 
inherent value, which is not based on preference, final and/or instrumental value. They 
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The Foundation of Inherent Human Value 
 
What ground would there be for inherent human value? An initially plausible first 
suggestion is that we should expect it to parallel how the differential values are 
grounded. Both final and instrumental values are related to non-evaluative features, that 
is, supernatural or, which is more common, natural features. What would be especially 
relevant here is the shape of the relation between final value and such features; a 
thought underscored by the standard priority of final over instrumental value, but also 
by the currency of the Kantian notion of treating persons as ends. End-values and aim-
values can be seen as varieties of final value (as David J. Velleman hints in his 1999 
essay). 
 
Theories of final value suggest the existence of a close connection between evaluative 
properties and non-evaluative properties. Such theories are generally to the effect that a 
difference in evaluative properties entails a difference in non-evaluative properties; 
evaluative properties are often claimed to obtain in virtue of the non-evaluative 
properties. A way of putting this is that final values supervene on non-evaluative states 
of affairs, similar to how mental states are believed to supervene on states of the brain. 
For example, utilitarians hold that ethical final value supervenes on pleasure. The 
relevant set of non-evaluative properties is the supervenience base of the final value. 
 
What, then, would be the supervenience base of inherent human value? Two different 
ways of answering this question may be distinguished, ethical individualism and ethical 
collectivism. The first takes the value of the individual to depend on his or her non-
evaluative properties. The second takes that value to be depend on non-evaluative 
properties that are characteristic of the collective that the individual belongs to, which 
here would be something like our species. Even though philosophers like Blumenfeld 
and Nozick have taken the latter position, there are good reasons to reject it (see, for 
instance, James Rachels 1990, p. 177ff, and Dan Egonsson 1998, ch. 9). It is odd to 
value people because of how their colleagues in general are, or how they are at their 
best or worst. Therefore I shall limit myself to ethical individualism. 
 
It is a religious belief commonly held that we all are parts of a sacred creation and/or 
that we are created in the image of God, having immortal souls. It is hard to see, 
however, how these beliefs could be the supervenience base for our inherent value. If 
God’s creation were sacred, then individuals of all forms of life would have inherent 
value. Yet, that is not the belief in Jewish, Christian, or Islamic traditions, where the 
assumption of equal value might be traced. Furthermore, even if all human beings were 
created in the image of God, it appears that people may lose this likeness. People also 
seem to be valued differently, according to the degree to which they actually resemble 
God. Is not the ascending on such a scale what religious life is about? Ronald Dworkin 
(1993) has attempted a secular version of the theory of the sacredness of life, the point 
of which is that individuals are both products and representatives of the creative power 
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of life. Everything in nature has value in itself, but human beings would have 
exceptional value because they represent the combined creativity of nature and culture. 
Yet, as Göran Collste observes (2002, p. 59), in that way people would have unequal 
value depending on how much creativity they embody. 
 
A common answer is that it is the fact that people are persons that gives them equal 
ethical value. This position typically relies on Kantianism, but its roots go back to Plato 
and Aristotle. By ‘person’ Kant (1785) means an individual (not necessarily belonging 
to our species) with autonomy and capacity to reason and deliberate about what to do, 
therein employing allegedly universal ethical principles that he or she embraces. One 
finds a variant of this view in the critique of human-centered, so-called speciesist ethics 
by James Rachels (1990) and Peter Singer (1993). They think that biographical life, in 
contrast to merely biological life, is the objective ground for the uniquely high value 
they consider human beings to have. Biographical life is characterized by the existence 
of an acting subject endowed with a personal history of meaning and importance, 
involving projects that can be pursued. That we are alive is only valuable as a 
precondition for leading biographical lives. 
 
The drawback in both cases is a confounding of valuing individuals in virtue of how 
they actually are and in virtue of how beings of their kind potentially and ideally are. 
The former is an instance of ethical individualism, the later an instance of ethical 
collectivism. We cannot have it both ways, but this is precisely what the mentioned 
philosophers try to do. As for Kant, he is mainly on the collectivist line, founding our 
dignity – our being “ends” – in an idealized personhood of autonomy and rational 
willing. Yet, he is on the individualist line when he takes human dignity to be 
compatible with the advocacy of rough, authoritarian methods in the schooling of 
children and in the handling of “savages” – both categories are denied respect for 
autonomy and integrity, the essential company of dignity. Such practices might be 
explained by personhood developing progressively, hence, as having degrees, but then 
it cannot ground our equal value. The concept of biographical being is wider than the 
Kantian concept of person, but since it too comes in degrees it will suffer the same 
weakness when it comes to marginal cases like small children, mentally disabled, and 
demented elderly, which may rank so low in biographical being that it makes the 
application of this category dubious. 
 
The only way to avoid that weakness and to stay with ethical individualism appears to 
be the radical theory suggested by Egonsson (1998). The sole property in which we all 
are equal is, he contends, that we belong to the same species, Homo sapiens. Therefore, 
this alone can serve as supervenience base for our equal value, Egonsson argues. What 
is odd and arbitrary about this, is that mere membership of a species would ground the 
value of their members. Furthermore, as the basis for equal value between human 
beings, that idea has a distinctive smell of the prejudice of speciesism. 
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The proposals discussed above share an assumption that I think we must question, viz., 
that there is a supervenience base for inherent value. Its form is this: 
 
Individual p has inherent value V in virtue of a certain set of supernatural or natural 
properties N becoming to p. 
 
Apart from the fact that major candidates for N that one can think of come in degrees, it 
also seems that for any N one can always ask whether an individual having N also has 
V, and vice versa. This objection draws on G. E. Moore’s classical open question-
argument, but here the objection is stronger, since the openness is a matter of moral 
properties rather than semantics, as Moore took it to be. If the question is open to our 
moral intuition, then we probably have not caught the intimate connection of 
supervenience. The simple reason, I think, is that none of the proposals as to the 
identity of N touches the significant piece. No proposed N seems able to explain that 
which most needs explaining, viz. the unique power that our inherent value would have 
in regard to the whole system of ethics and practical morality. 
 
For inherent human value, I submit, there simply is no supervenience base. We do not 
have inherent value in virtue of being such and such, no matter how we chose it. This 
explains why no satisfactory supervenience base has yet been found, which in turn 
explains why the assumption of equal value has remained so obscure and ideological: 
we have tried to apply a pattern of analysis that here is inapplicable. It is possible, 
nevertheless, to ground our equal value in ways other than supervenience. Its content 
can be characterized, and an account of its constitution be given. Furthermore, we can 





Inherent human value, I take it, needs to be shown as having such substance as to 
constitute a basic ethical meta-reason, viz., that which makes our ethical system of, or 
competence for, normative reasons reasonable. Such meta-ethical power of inherent 
value is what above all needs to be explained. And that is where love comes in. The 
account of inherent value that I suggest can be summarized thus: human beings are 
worth loving.  
 
This idea is inspired by the notion of love in Christian tradition, which is the main 
source of the Western conception of inherent human value (see, e.g., Nygren 1930 and 
1936; also Ramsey 1950). The thought here is that all human beings should be loved, 
which presupposes that they are worth loving. On the surface of it, this idea matches a 
central strand in contemporary value theory founded by Franz Brentano. According to 
Brentano (1889) the good or valuable is that which is worth loving. Brentano, however, 
considers things, events, and states rather than individuals, which makes him interpret 
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’love’ and ‘worth loving’ in a limiting way. To love something is, according to him, to 
prefer it to something else. Consequently, worth loving would have degrees also, 
determined with reference to preference. The reason for this construal was that he 
needed a comparative concept of value that makes things differ in value – a concept of 
differential value, which is of no interest in this context.  
 
The concepts of love and being worth loving that we find in the Christian tradition are 
not such. They are not comparative, have no degrees, but refer to a binary normative 
status: a matter of either–or, where we all are to find on the positive side. It is question 
of a love that is unconditional. Hence, to be loved and worth loving is a character of 
human beings distinct from what particular individuals may prefer or strive for. There 
is no argument of the structure “P is loved, because P is such and such.”7
 
 In Christian 
tradition this unconditional love is called ‘agape’ and it is believed to be of divine kind. 
It stands in contrast to the individually motivated, human kind of love called ‘eros’ (see 
Nygren 1930, ch. 1). In the light of the reference to God, there is a theological content 
to agape, which to non-believers (like me) makes it problematic. I suggest a reformed, 
non-theological version of agape to be more fruitful; let me call it agapic love. 
The character and mode of existence of agapic love have to be spelled out more 
carefully, and a plausible meta-ethical base has to be offered for the thesis that all 
humans are worth loving in this sense. I believe that these two issues are intertwined. 
For the present purpose I think it suffices to show that something of this kind exists and 
can be incorporated into a plausible meta-ethics. Let me presuppose the ontology and 
metaphysics of inherent human value to be subjectivist in a sense, in that some kind of 
subject somehow constitutes the inherent human value and hence our being worth 
loving. I furthermore take it to be secular, in that it does not invoke a God or any man-
independent, Platonic order of values, but consider the valuing subject to be of some 
human kind.8
 
 What would that be? One strategy is to identify a relevant set of empirical 
human beings, another to identify a relevant human yet ideal observer.  
The first strategy stems from the Brentano tradition in value-theory and is what, for 
instance, Egonsson (1998) adopts. Egonsson considers our equal value to be constituted 
by a more or less universal preference of human beings for human beings. But it is not 
clear what the relevant comparison class would be. With regard to ghosts, rats, and 
pigs, yes, probably there is such a preference – but with regard to friends, and members 
of the same nation, religion or culture, probably not. The main problem, however, is 
that the preference Egonsson takes to exist would not manage to constitute the equal 
value of human individuals. Preferring one category to another does not imply equal 
preference for their members, unless one employs the method of ethical collectivism 
earlier rejected.  
 
Peter Singer, for one, employs the second strategy. He forwards a theory of value-
constituency based on preferences, but which replaces actual preferences with rational 
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ones, viz. those of an idealized human observer. What the preference of that being 
would consider is the optimal life of different species. If we could try all lives, had 
memories of all of them, and had to choose rationally which one to live, then human 
life would rank highest and therefore be chosen, Singer argues (1993, p. 107). 
However, even if one disregards the impracticability and hazardous character of this 
method Singer, like Egonsson, would only end up with preference for a category, which 
only ethical collectivists could transfer to equal preferences for its individuals. 
Moreover, were his method applied to the lives of classes of individuals, unequal value 
would follow. 
 
On both strategies, the value-constituting human subject has to regard human 
individuals, and its value-constituting reaction has to be equal to all. On the first 
strategy, the latter requirement is quite inconceivable already by the dependence on 
comparison and preference; one cannot imagine everyone viewing everyone else 
without evaluatively preferring some to others, where those preferred surely would vary 
among them. There remains, then, only the second strategy. It is in the Christian notion 
of God in the shape of an ideal man, together with the notion of agape, I think one finds 
the view that offers a way meet to the above requirements. 
 
The character of Jesus in the New Testament is a godlike man, the Son of God, with 
power to change our God-given laws. As such he is a kind of ideal observer, with 
constitutive authority in fundamental ethical matters. It is essential to his character that 
he, while being a man, incarnates divine agape. Interestingly enough, it is a human 
form of love that in this way returns sanctified to us. The pattern for divine agape is 
provided by the love of human parents for their children. In Christian tradition, which 
on this point joins with Jewish tradition, agape is part of a wider notion of God as 
father, and with “us, His children” as members of one and the same family. It is God’s 
fatherly love for his children that gives us inherent value (see, e.g., Nygren 1930 and 
Collste 2002). God directs his love at each individual in his or her uniqueness. It is 
undiscriminating, all-embracing. This is possible because it is unconditional with 
regard to the qualities of the individuals, and so is without reason. It is a love that we in 
human context would articulate through the seemingly empty but still highly 
meaningful phrase “Because you are you!” That we are members of God’s family is a 
merely a preconditional value. It is neither the cause of God’s love, since God’s modes 
of being are without cause, nor the reason for it, since his love is not conditional on any 
feature we may have. 
 
The use of the family metaphor I think bears witness to a long-standing presence of 
agapic love in human life, and furthermore testifies to it as a widely accepted 
explanation of the existence of a basic, inherent value of individuals.9 The question 
here is whether we are entitled to generalize such optimal parental love as becoming to 
all human beings, without assuming the existence of God and supposing us to be 
children of God. We can, I submit. Man in diverse cultures has time and again operated 
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with idealized beings, more or less human, loving all. It may suffice to mention Kung 
Tzu, Buddha, and Jesus. In modern time, we seek to identify compassionate and 
unselfishly loving persons that more or less incarnate this ideal, persons like Gandhi, 
Mother Teresa, Janusz Korczak, and Nelson Mandela. And it is loving figures like 
these that most people, if they were in a position to sincerely and reflectively choose, 
would accord the position of judge as to their value as a human being. Hence, to appeal 
to the reactions of an ideal observer is an age-old and received methodological strategy 
in meta-ethics. It is current also in, for instance, the philosophical tradition after David 
Hume. 
 
Hume assumed the existence of a universal but in practical life often hidden human 
sympathy. According to him, it is purified sympathetic reactions in the face of what 
happens to people that constitutes our evidence for the valid principles of ethics. Yet, 
the Humean view is not appropriate in the present context, since on his theory 
sympathy is directed towards events, mental states and traits of character, and grounds 
liking and disliking of a comparative and ranking kind. Also, on this theory the ideal 
observer reacts ethically to us merely as a “generalized other,” as Seyla Benhabib has 
put it (1992), and not as the unique persons we are. Her point is appropriate also when 
one considers the Kantian notion of respect for human dignity, which we as pretended 
lawmakers for the Kingdom of Ends are to bring to our acts. That respect is roughly 
equal to love as a moral emotion, claims David J. Velleman (1999, p. 360ff). However, 
what that ideal respect, or love, regards is not individuals in their unique particularity, 
but in their “true self,” which is a type, viz. universal, rational being. 
 
In Christian tradition, God sees us as we are, sees our whole life, and still loves us. 
Similarly, the ideal human observer would consider us as unique individuals, yet not 
respond lovingly to us because of how we are or what we do at one time of another, but 
do so unconditionally. His or her agapic love would be a love for people in their 
wholeness, with full knowledge of their complex conditions and history, seeing their 
difficulties, defeats and victories, sorrows and joys, hopes and longings. This, of 
course, is out of reach for actual people. But the conceptual construct of such an all-
knowing, all-understanding and compassionate ideal observer, in a context of value-
constituency pertaining to individuals, is perfectly feasible. Considering the capacity 
for the kind of unselfish, unconditional love that, for instance, a parent can have for his 
or her children, this construction is also, as we saw, well entrenched. It is conceivable 
and reasonable, I would say, that such a human observer, faced with every human being 
and fully knowing and fully understanding him or her, would react with agapic love to 
all. 
 
Agapic love, I suggest, is a holistically verdictive reaction. As reaction, it is emotional 
and cognitive in character, but does not have a conative component. The reason for this 
is that the reacting subject is not an actor in relation to us. It is emotional, in that it is 
loving feeling towards the contemplated individuals. It is cognitive, since that feeling is 
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joined to knowing and understanding the individuals. This combined emotional and 
cognitive reaction is verdictive, by summative positing worth in them, which minimally 
is being worthy of the observer’s love. It is holistic, finally, by knowing, understanding 
and judging them, not as occurring in a certain slice of space and time, but as complex 
wholes stretching over space and time. This means that the ideal human observer would 
see us somewhat like a god would. Since the observer is the idealized version of a 
human being, loving human beings once they are fully known and understood will 
come naturally. 
 
I hope it should be clear by now how agapic love grounds inherent value. In people’s 
lives there are better and worse conditions and events, as well as better and worse acts, 
all in different respects, and this makes us quite incommensurate when our whole life is 
considered. It is meaningless to measure us as wholes. So, were a knowing and 
understanding observer with capacity for unconditional love to react to us as unique 
wholes, then, I submit, we would all evoke a measureless loving reaction. This 
hypothetical love, ideal but reasonable, suffices for our being worth loving, and 
therefore suffices for our inherent human value. Since the former is incommensurable 
and in this sense equal, the latter is so as well. On this construal our equal value is also 
objective, in the sense that everyone has it and cannot lose it (so long as they live), 





What about fantastic beings other than humans, might they not be loved with agapic 
love by an ideal human observer and thereby gain inherent human value, which hence 
would undergo inflation and appear absurd? Most other beings, however, are not 
possible for an ideal human observer to understand and could therefore not be 
embraced by the holistically verdictive loving reaction to humans. If they could be 
understood, the ideal human observer would not be able to identify with them, which 
seems necessary for love towards them. Even if the ideal observer could identify with 
them – as we somewhat can with other primates – this identification would not feed the 
emotional bond that we have with other human beings that “might have been me.” The 
latter, I believe, is a condition for the agapic love of the ideal human towards us. 
However, even if we would grant inherent human value to, say, other primates, this 
would not be highly consequential. It is not obvious that their inherent human value 
would incite us to adopt an equal motivational structure with regard to their well-being; 
there are good reasons to let them flourish according to their specific (non-human) 
mode of being. Furthermore, the supreme value of human life, bridging inherent human 
value to normative ethics, is not present here. 
 
A related question is whether my suggested construction does meet the objection raised 
against other secular defenses of the assumption of equal value, that they either do not 
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accommodate marginal cases like small children, the mentally handicapped and 
demented elderly, or else accord inherent human value to fetuses. I think that it does. 
The agapic love of an ideal human observer presupposes that there is someone with a 
life to which he or she can react. Being a living, elementary person is a preconditional 
value. Fetuses are not elementary persons with something we would call a human life. 
Small children, on the other hand, are such persons and they have a life, even if this 
would happen to end early. The mentally handicapped are elementary persons with a 
life also. As to the demented elderly, even those with radically reduced personality, 
their condition is merely a phase of their life as a whole, and the latter is the proper 
object of agapic love. Furthermore, as far as they to some degree can realize some 
differential values characteristic of the supreme value of human life, they are proper 
patients of our ethical concerns. 
 
Another doubt is whether an ideal human observer actually would have agapic love 
towards people such as Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin, and Saddam Hussein. Are there not 
monsters unlovable even for an ideal observer? There certainly are several hard cases. 
Yet, since we have to do with specimen of the fantastic, complicated, awesome and 
sensitive Homo sapiens, we do not know all the facts in the problematic cases, and 
furthermore we cannot fully represent the reactions of an agapic-loving ideal observer, I 
believe it to be a fair strategy to give such cases the benefit of doubt. When we do that, 
we also create a moral margin to compensate for the bad luck that people may have.  
 
Several considerations support this strategy. For one, the ideal observer does not react 
to people at some, perhaps monstrous, time. Rather, the ideal observer reacts to their 
life as a whole. That scope, as narratives in biographies, novels and films repeatedly 
show, changes the view and evaluation of people; monsters as well as saints turn out to 
be recognizably human. One should therefore not be surprised that is seems possible 
always to find people – a parent, wife, child, friend – who love, in spite of everything, 
those that others regard as monsters. Perhaps the ideal human observer would be on 
their side. Furthermore, the idea of evaluating us as wholes is inevitable in another 
crucial context also, viz. when the life of our species is evaluated. Were it judged from 
what it is at horrible times, then it is far from certain that an ideal human observer 
would prefer it to lives of other species. 
 
There are philosophers who have problems with taking a kind of Christian universal 
love as basic in ethics. One objection is that such love is something too far fetched for 
ethics. Ingemar Hedenius, for instance, rejected the idea as an “expression of the moral 
Super-ego of Western culture at its maddest” (1982, p. 18; my translation). What the 
bulk of such criticism seems to concern, however, is not agapic love in the specific 
meta-ethical shape that I have cast it. Objections like Hedenius’ rather aim at virtue-
ethical or act-oriented ethical stances, prescribing that we love everyone and love them 
equally. I agree with the critique of that position as unduly moralistic; ethics should not, 
in spite of its universalistic and impersonal character, demand of people always to 
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mirror that strictly in their moral practice. I adhere to the ideal of a moderate and what 
Samuel Scheffler calls ‘human morality’ (1992, p. 122). 
 
Another objection, focused on love as foundational for ethics, is Kant’s thought that 
this would make ethics overly emotional, which is a problem since emotions are 
unstable and subject to the laws of our animal nature. They are not something of 
rational nature, and for Kant the core of ethics has to be rational (Kant 1785). The one 
thing does not exclude the other, and I have construed agapic love with both cognitive 
and emotional components. Since the loving reactions are those of an ideal human 
observer, occurring in hypothetical situations where individuals are viewed and 
verdictively reacted to as wholes, they are not due to be unstable. That such loving 
feeling plays a founding role for normative ethics speaks for rather than against my 
account, since it makes ethics inspiring in a way that the thought of binding law does 
not. 
 
Finally, is there not a special problem with my construction, viz., that it is tailored to 
yield the desired result? That we are worth loving would be a thesis that I prove with 
the help of an unconditionally loving ideal observer. We need an independent defense 
for the agapic loving ideal observer. I agree, and think that I have sketched such a 
defense. It builds on the existence of widely recognized meta-ethical role models, 
preferred ethical judges, like Jesus, Mother Theresa, and Nelson Mandela, who in 
essential respects are similar to my ideal human observer. When we scrutinize 
ourselves, I think most people will find something like him or her at the core of their 
moral conscience. 
 
Love as Meta-Reason 
 
Let us assume that agapic love grounds incomparable inherent value, and thereby equal 
human value. Does this mean that agapic love through that relation becomes a basic 
meta-reason with regard to ethics, viz. that which makes our ethical system of, or 
competence for, normative reasons reasonable? The issue seems to be whether inherent 
human value, so construed, can fill that foundational role for ethics. Since the ideal 
observer’s agapic love lacks a conative component, the resulting inherent human would 
seem to value lack such a component also, one might think. And if so, neither agapic 
love nor inherent human value appears to entail an interest in enhancing people’s lives, 
especially when one considers that this value applies to them as contingent, historical 
wholes, that is, when their lives are seen as having come to an end. No matter how 
people are, live, and act the ideal observer would love them and they would be 
unconditionally worth loving. Were ethics to be based on these assumptions, we risk 
having it in the image of a complacent, non-interfering God. 
 
What seems to lack is a normative impetus from unwillingness to accept all states of 
affairs in human life, and willingness to forward the states, lives, attitudes and acts that 
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are desirable. Only with such substance, the meta-ethical fact that people are worth 
loving seems to acquire the drive that naturally translates into principles and systems of 
ethics, or into formation of moral competence, some kind of phronesis, or practical 
wisdom, giving us direct reason for loving actions and practices. So, if inherent human 
value is to have such normative impetus it needs to bind essentially to something other 
than our inherent value, viz. to our differential values, values that regard the changing, 
actual qualities of our lives. This is a considerable objection, but I think that it can be 
met, on three lines of argument. 
 
First, our being worth loving looks different from the side of its constitution and from 
the side of its functioning in our moral practice. From the former side, to be worth 
loving does appear to entail complacency, by its establishment through the reactions of 
an ideal but non-acting human observer. And this cannot be otherwise, since he or she 
sees our lives as complete wholes. From the latter side, however, this is not the case. 
Once our inherent value is established, it makes us worth loving by non-ideal, actual 
and acting human beings also. By sharing in the foundational idea of our inherent and 
therefore equal value, we so to say touch the agapic love of the idealized observer. This 
involves taking all to be worthy of our love even though we cannot see their life as a 
whole. And since we are agents at particular times and places, surrounded by real 
people, it gives us reason, on whatever scene we act, to adopt a combined cognitive, 
conative and emotional structure that at least in principle regards the well-being of all 
people. Herein one finds reason enough to make a pillar for ethical systems and moral 
competence. It may in passing be noted that the character of Jesus in the New 
Testament, the believed god-man said to have wandered around preaching and showing 
brotherly love for all, marks a transformation from divine and non-interfering agape to 
a human, interfering universal love. One could also illustrate this with the other 
presumed religious, moral and political ideal figures mentioned above. 
 
Second, though being unconditional and inspiring to normativity, agapic love and 
inherent human value do not dictate a specified content to ethical principles or moral 
competence. All it dictates is attitudes and behaviour that express respect for people’s 
inherent value, their being worth loving. I quite agree with Derek Parfit, writing that 
“people have dignity or value in the […] sense that, given their nature as rational 
beings, they must always be treated in certain positive ways” (Parfit forthcoming; I 
quote from a preprint version). This means that various ethical systems, and various 
versions of moral competence, may claim reasoned support from assumptions of agapic 
love and inherent human value, which is also what one finds to be the case. That, of 
course, does not mean that they would be equally valid. The indecisiveness 
notwithstanding, the meta-reasons in question are important for our choices of ethics, 
since one may well argue that one ethical system, or one form of moral competence, 
gives better expression of our inherent value than another. 
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Third, when it comes to the shaping of our ethics and/or moral competence, agapic love 
and inherent human value are not alone to play the part of meta-reason. In common 
morality the idea of equal value among human beings is supplemented with the 
assumption of a unique, or uniquely high, value of human life. This is a value of life 
form. It is not unconditional, but displays a comparison between the characteristics of 
different forms of life, where the human life form would be found superior. What 
matters in such a fancied comparison is the kind and degree of what I called 
‘differential values,’ realized through the various forms of life. Yet, the value of a life 
form is not necessarily conditional in the sense of being a function of a specific set of 
final and instrumental values; rather, it is semi-conditional, depending on the existence 
of a relevant range of such sets. This weaker conditionality makes the value of human 
life serve as a bridge by which human beings with inherent value come to enter the 
normative principles that articulate humanistic values and norms. Here, then, is a 
supplementary pillar of normative ethics. 
 
I know of no other explanation of normative ethics that is better entrenched in culture, 
religion and everyday moral thought. And I know of no one stronger or more 
reasonable. It combines the non-natural aspect of idealization with the natural aspect of 
human psychology. It furthermore combines firmness as to our being worth loving, to 
our inherent, equal value, with flexibility when it comes to the principles or moral 
competence of normative ethics, by its openness for various differential values, where 
our preferences and agreements will have a say. This makes it nicely compatible with 
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1 For an overview of notions of love, see Outka (2001). 
 
2 The case of virtue ethics is quite complicated. In classic, Aristotelian theory most of the virtues have a 
personal and partial character – except for justice, as John Cottingham has argued convincingly 
(Cottingham 1996). Justice as fairness and equity does not fit the Aristotelian pattern of analysis and it 
“seems by its very nature impartialistic,” says Cottingham (ibid., p. 68). He argues that with Descartes 
this part of virtue theory develops into a “universal and egalitarian vision of goodness which promises to 
rescue value from the dominance of fortune,” and the attractions of this vision have exercised such a 
strong pull on our moral imagination that traditional virtue theory has progressively lost its power to 
command our allegiance (ibid., p. 75). I think he is right in this. 
 
3 See Dancy 1993 ch.5:3, and 2004 ch. 8:1. He remarks that “ordinary subjective reasons are likely to be 
permitted but not validated by the objectification process, for instance those which stem from individual 
preferences where there is no tendency to claim that we are right to prefer what we do” (1993, p. 154). 
 
4 The quote is from an unpublished paper that Jonathan Dancy generously has shared with me in a 
personal communication. A particularistic assumption of equal value could be explained by the 
acceptance of absolute value belonging to persons, but also by the positing of meta-reason, where equal 
Essays Philos (2011) 12:1                                                                                                Fjellström | 129 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
human value would have a role. I guess Dancy would prefer the former alternative (see, e.g., his 1983). 
In any case, he rejects the idea of meta-reason (2004, p. 160) – contrary to the road I am venturing in this 
essay. 
5 A recent, rich collection of essays on partiality and impartiality (Feltham & Cotttingham 2010) focuses 
on such approaches. 
 
6 Love’s role as directly reason-giving is what, for instance, Bernhard Williams (1981), Harry G. 
Frankfurt (2004), and Lawrence Blum (1986) discuss. 
 
7 Gene Outka speaks about human beings as “irreducibly valuable” in agape (1972, p. 12).  
 
8 This can be assumed without speciesism, as I have argued (2002). 
 
9 Gregory Vlastos, who indicates a parallel between non-gradable human worth and unconditional love, 
also appeals to the metaphor of a “loving family” to defend egalitarianism (Vlastos 1984).  
 
10 I wish to thank Anna Bergqvist, Jens Johansson, Ulrik Kihlbom, Frans Svensson and the anonymous 
referee of Essays in Philosophy for valuable comments. 
